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Legislation considers men [and women] as he [she] is, in order to turn
him [her] to good uses in human society. Out of ferocity, avarice, and
ambition, the three vices which run throughout the human race, it creates the military, merchant, and the governing classes, and thus the
strength, riches, and wisdom of commonwealths. Out of these three
great vices, which would certainly destroy all mankind on the face of
the earth, it creates civil happiness.
Giambattista Vico, The New Science, 1968 (1744), p. 62.
In most of Africa, the state is a contested terrain where different nationalities, sub-nationalities, ‘ethnic groups’ and communities go to fight
for the appropriation of resources including power. A state which is a
contested terrain in this sense can only be an anarchy of self-seeking
and a theatre of war.
Claude Ake, The Feasibility of Democracy in Africa, 2003, p. 167.
Dalkeennii la kala qaybiyee cadowga loo qayday
Qaadan waa awoogeen amxaar qurub la siiyaaye
Qarqarsiga ka dirir iyo anaa qaabbil kuu taline
Maantoo qudhiisii xabaal lagu qarqooreeyey
Weli qoonti way taagan tahay quudhsigii shalaye
Qaxar iyo dhib nagu soo kordhiyo qolada mooyaane
Weli qoodhi kama ay dhammaan qaranka soomaale
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Hal haddii qaddaru eebbahay kaare kala qaaro
In la qalo ninkii dhiqi jiraa aan ka qaanicine
Dabbaax baa mindida kula qadhqadha qaalinta irmaane
Qasdigoodu ba’anaa kuwaa qurus ka doonaaya
Qaabaanqabtiyo beelyadiyo haaddan qananaysa
EE waax qabiil lagu hantiyo garasho qoodaystay
Qorshohoodu socon maayo oo ways qatalayaane
EEbbow qarkay maanta taal qadanka soo meeri
Soomaalidaa kala qubane qoysba dhan u jeedo
Qaraabada isugu keen allow qaabad nabadaysa
Qarankeenni soo celi aallow qaaddirbaa tahaye!
Maxamuud A. Cabdalle (Shiine) 2006
I. Introduction
As of this writing, too far from “civil happiness,” Somalis continue
sliding deeper into a fallen time—pitiful victims of their own follies
and an ill-informed, if not manipulative, international and regional
system. More precisely, the fight over the state in the past decade and
a half has been at once violent and so disabling that, in the eyes of the
rest of the world, Somalis have become the paradigmatic embodiment
of self-inflicted politicide. Dismayingly, though the Somali state institutions are no more, the contestants wage their battles as if the prize
is just waiting to be picked up. Oblivious, then, to the fact that the
state and governance are more than the sum of capricious self-promotion and claims of Potemkin political appellations and appointments,
the aggressively ambitious bestow a vulgar concreteness to Jorge Luis
Borges’ metaphor of the condition of “two bald men fighting over a
comb.” The ultimate costs of the death of the state and subsequent
communal strife are a withering of the national civic identity and
spirit and, therefore, a descent into a form of moronic existence. Six
instantiations of this condition are: (a) disunity exemplified by some
in the northern Somali Republic (Somaliland) calling for a separate
sovereignty in that region; (b) an essentialization of clanist maneuvers
and mischief that have proven to be incapable of producing legitimate
and competent leaders fit for the challenges of the epoch, let alone
bring forth workable institutions for the immediate juncture; (c) the
degeneration of Mogadishu from the once breezy, relatively cosmopolitan nerve-center of the post-colonial order to a dilapidated hell’s
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gate overwhelmed by new deadly conflagrations and mountains of illdisposed filth; (d) a deepening socioeconomic impoverishment, barely
assuaged by remittances from relatives in the diaspora, decline in educational opportunities and standards, and deteriorating public health,1
including the return of polio; (e) an acute national vulnerability to easy
bamboozlement, and now direct military intervention or invasion by
foreign actors, particularly neighboring Ethiopia; and (f) a mixture of
incredulity and contempt on the part of the larger global community.
To be sure, these negative attributes (and many more) make up the
defining face of Somali reality. But it is also vital to note that, among
the paradoxes of the current sharp cut in time (the meaning of civil
war), numerous ordinary women and men, in every zone of the country, have taken it upon themselves to address the immediate concerns
of their families and neighborhoods, the virus of sectarian cabals, and,
commensurately, keep the candle of civic values flickering for a future
undergirded by a peaceful and legitimate and competent governance.
If at the core of the Somali catastrophe, defined as a series of interlocked crises, is the bloody and unending tussle over political power
and the direction of the society, last year’s tidings from Mogadishu
conveyed the appearance of a new actor upon the stage: the Union of
Islamic Courts. Claiming to be at once fed up with polluting warlord
shenanigans and inspired and tightly held together by an Islamic zeitgeist rather than kin loyalty or hunger for egotistical glory through
personal rule, the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) changed immediate
history2: it defeated the warlords camped in Mogadishu; extended its
influence into most of the deep south and the central regions; opened
both Mogadishu airport and port facilities for general use; returned
the streets of the capital to its denizens; challenged the legitimacy and
leadership of what many Somalis had labeled a fadhiid-like (Somali
for retarded) Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and its regional
patrons; and rattled the nerves of some of the foreign policy officials
of the current U.S. Administration3 and strict secularists. Despite some
lightning successes and raising the already high temperature of politics in Somalia, the victory of the UIC did not last long. A combination
of sophomoric tactical mistakes (e.g., reactionary and foolish social
policy declarations and acts, severe lack of administrative and worldly
sophistication, and ill-prepared but loud nationalist bravado against
an Ethiopian regime itching for an opportunity to set up its own clients to run Somalia) and a desperate pleading by the leadership of
the TFG (President Abdullahi Yusuf and Prime Minister Ali Geedi),
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under an alarmist fabrication that “Islamic terrorists” aligned with
Al-Qaida had infiltrated the UIC, convinced the U.S. to bless and aid
Ethiopia’s invasion.4 The ultimate objectives included these three: to
destroy the Union of Islamic Courts, their leadership and base of support; to capture Mogadishu; and to install Colonel Yusuf and his agreeable regime.
At the moment of this writing, the Ethiopian invasion is five-months
old and has had the following consequences: Mogadishu’s residents
are thrown back into the violent and twilight zone where immediate
deprivation and untimely death lurk; Ethiopian forces and their junior
Somali satraps are pitted against an urban resistance that is not limited
to the remnants of the armed wing of the UIC militia; over a thousand
persons have been killed so far, and hundreds of thousands of civilians
have fled, increasing pressure on already dismal conditions for refugees in camps inside and outside the boundaries of the country; hatred
for Ethiopia and sympathy for, if not solidarity with, the resistance has
become more visible, particularly among the diaspora;5 and any possible redemption and effectiveness of the TFG has all but evaporated,
except among those who either betray stigmata of clanist vice or are
driven by sheer opportunistic motivations. Here is how one reporter
relayed the crux of these developments:
There was a burst of optimism beginning Dec. 28, when government
troops, with Ethiopian firepower behind them, marched into Mogadishu
and planted the hope that the anarchy was ending. Cheering crowds
poured into ruined streets. Aid experts in Nairobi circulated ambitious
reconstruction plans. Ethiopian and American officials, who had worked
together to overthrow the Islamists, breathed a mutual sigh of relief.
But what has happened in the past few weeks has killed (my emphasis)
that mood. A deadly insurgency has started, beginning with a few clans
connected to the Islamists and now expanding to several more… . All
analysts agree that the violence will continue and probably intensify
unless the government reconciles with clan elders, who control as much
as anyone controls, what happens in Somalia.
…So far, there’s been very little of that. Instead of reaching out to truly
influential figures, analysts say the government has picked ministers not
because they have any substantial support among their clans but because
they will do the government’s bidding. The result is an increasingly isolated, authoritarian and unpopular government in which the transitional
president, Abdillahi Yusuf Ahmed, is accused of behaving more like a
clan warlord (my emphasis)—which he was—than a national leader.6
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Looking at these reports closely reminds one of Aristotle’s injunction in The Politics that two things are most corrosive of political leadership and institutions: hatred and contempt. The first is the antithesis
of good will, compassion, and fairness; the latter is the opposite of
respect, integrity, and wise competence—the essential ingredients of
authority. Given such dire circumstances, the Somali catastrophe has
entered a new stage: direct foreign occupation and an ugly spectacle
typified by bloodletting and civic dishonor. This assignment, more
urgent than ever, is an exploration of the aporia of governance in the
contemporary Somali milieu. Seeking theoretical and narrative accumulation, it raises four pertinent and difficult questions:
• What is the state?
• Why do Somalis need a national state?
• What kind of a state might that be?
• How might that state come into being and maintain a viable existence?
While it is not possible to treat exhaustively these large questions, I
will attempt to enter into each one of them, with a hope of advancing
the practical reasoning so much needed among Somalis, particularly
those who aspire to influence the fate of the country in a constructive
way. This essay, partly drawing on and updating already published
research, has four main components. First, I will address briefly the
phenomena of the state and governance. Second, I will present a historical sketch of the Somali context. Third, I will examine the current
age of statelessness and some attempts to reconstruct the state. Fourth,
I will reassert why the state is even more significant for the journey
forward and will offer a quick look at some different arrangements of
governance that a new state might take. I will conclude with a few civic
meditations. Finally, there are two supreme convictions that inform this
exercise. The first is that the state is not only, in the famous expression of
Jacob Burckhardt, “a work of art,” it is equally a necessity for civilized living.7
The second relates to the role of intellectuals in contexts similar to the
Somali one. Since by themselves they can’t stop the politically egotistical and their armies, in the memorable words of Julian Benda, “from
filling all history with the noise of their hatred and their slaughters,”
intellectuals can deny them the opportunity of “thinking of themselves
as great men [or women] as they carry out these activities.”8
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II. The State: What is it?
To talk about governance presupposes the existence of both political
activity and a state. If governance is the concrete manner of conducting public power, politics is the sum of multifarious engagements that,
first, establish contact and workable concordance among strangers
and, second, accompany competition for influence and authority. The
state is, essentially, the main institutional link between politics and
governance. The interplay between the three is constant.
Basic political activities precede the appearance of the state and
are not confined to its formal arena.9 Primordial groups, typified by
small bands and intimacy or, more precisely, kin attachments, have
existed and continue to survive, ever so precariously, without a formal authority structure solely designed to perform political tasks.
Such communities negotiate myriad individual and family interests
and idiosyncrasies, in addition to the vagaries of the general material
and cultural context, through custom and a set of reciprocal (talantaali
or gemeinschaft) but not necessarily equal arrangements. The seeds of
what we call the state are buried in those early human activities, but
the appearance of the state as we have known it is a relatively modern design. One would trace the genetic base and evolution through
a number of historical thresholds, which perhaps began with “city
republican forms” best exemplified by the little known but pioneering
Mesopotamian urban experiences and, later, the other more celebrated
version in classical Greece. These early aggregations of large, but by
no means universal, interests and networks, provision of public goods,
and the subsequent investments of authority in persons embedded in
such institutions give glimpses of some of the enduring characteristics
of what we contemporaneously identify as the state.
The evolution of the idea and structuring of the state is long and
complicated, and with numerous variations. That story is not told here.
What is relevant to our purposes is to note its ancient pedigree, define
its morphology, and point towards its key attributes. I define the state
as a constellation of norms, and institutions and those who inhabit them,
ostensibly to manage the collective political fate of a given society. Political
destiny includes significant contradictions and concerns that add up to
political identity and direction. Structurally, a state has the following
features: monopoly on coercion, specific territorial boundaries, a relatively fixed population, economic and cultural functions, sovereignty,
and recognition by other states and their organizations. The supreme
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Figure 1.1

public power, the state, in Stuart Hall’s phrase, is “a historical phenomenon;” that is, a creation of human beings in interaction which, in turn,
also acts in profound ways upon individual and collective life.
A. Frames
The state is not some formless thing. Rather, its internal constitution
can be anatomized. I suggest, heuristically, four main elements that
make up the state: leader, regime, administration, and commonwealth.
I touch upon each briefly.
The leader is the individual who immediately embodies the state in
question. He/she can make a positive difference in his/her time, leaving behind a legacy of competence, constitutionalism, and order. On
the other hand, the leader can also preside over ineptness, corruption,
and institutional disarray, whose consequences include an undermining of constructive efforts by others and the killing of civic spirit.
But leadership in not just “personal.” Usually appointed by the
leader, a regime is a constellation of officials assigned to the highest
portfolios of executive authority. To be sure, even under the most
favorable circumstances, both a leader and her/his team have their
own individual and clique interests that they represent. Nonetheless, if
a regime is to attain any modicum of acceptance and legitimacy by the
larger society, self or factional gain would have to be tamed by a combination of inclusive aspiration, a consciousness of needs, ethical and
legal conduct, and effective management. Thus, members of a successful regime are, in Walter Lippman’s expression, “the custodians of a
nation’s ideals, of the beliefs it cherishes, of its permanent hopes, of the
faith which makes a nation out of a mere aggregation of individuals.”
Moreover, leadership or regime cannot limit itself solely to the role of
the keeper of tradition and noble ambition; rather, progress depends
on the intellect to detect and the courage to articulate the hidden, and
even the unutterable, elements of what is often called “vision.”
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The administrative frame underscores the infrastructure of the state.
Here are located institutions (e.g., civil service, courts, law enforcement, and educational policy, facilities, curricula and personnel) that
carry out the day-to-day assignments and preserve procedures and
documents of the operations of the state. This is important for the way
a society governs itself—one which presents a test case for a regime to
monitor itself, the relative autonomy of offices and institutions, and
their competence. In other words, the greater the compliance with
basic rules and the legitimacy of state apparatuses, the larger the dividends for both a regime’s reputation and the viability of public life
and order. In contrast, the more the operational organs are tied to the
whims of regime interest, the greater the degree of evaporation of the
rightfulness of all three frames. This is the ultimate cost of incompetence and corruption.
The final element of the state is the most complex yet foundational:
commonwealth. In its most inclusive sense, this entails the association
and spirit of public belonging that is not easily derailed by narrow
impulses. To create an identity large enough to accommodate kinship
with the other beyond filial or other exclusive affiliations is to transmute
the self into a citizen—the oldest of the challenges to the establishment
of a political community. Here, then, particularity meets universality—that is, individual or group interest engages the imperative of a
large social bond characterized by civic values and, in the felicitous
expression of Edmund Burke, “common affections.” To be sure, leadership and regime formation in one sense are testimony to a significant
and inescapable alienation that comes with the momentary victory of
one group. Commonwealth, by contrast, absorbs the divisive fallout
from oppositional politics as it reinvigorates vivere civile. The result is
the return of the state, through sound governance, to societal ownership, a source of competence and an architect of common destiny.
Without this grounding spirit of belonging, particularity becomes the
norm—the antithesis of a national project. Politics, through the operations of the state, then is an unavoidable and contradictory activity
that at once unveils centrifugal issues and facilitates centripetal ideas
and action. In weighing the balance of the tension between difference
and commonality, it is the latter that defines the health of political life
in a given society. For, beyond the struggle for power, a rather narrow
objective that could easily lead to a desolation of the spirit, a politics
fit for “symbiotic creatures” is, in the lasting reflections of Johannes
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Figure 1.2: Forms of State
Adapted from Abdi Ismail Samatar and Ahmed I. Samatar, eds., The African State: Reconsiderations, p. 9.

Althusius, “the art of associating men [and women] for the purpose of
establishing, cultivating, and conserving social life among them.”
Each of the four frames of the state, much like the parts of a body,
performs at once its own local functions and works in concert with the
rest to keep the whole purring along. Any damage to one means trouble for the others; and when the accumulation of deficiencies becomes
greater than the assets, the state and its society are confronted with
major problems. Be that as it may, it will be a mistake to overlook the
significance of both the larger society, that is, the matrix of private
space and action, and the global environment. Put more precisely, in
addition to the vitality of the frames, the degree of health or morbidity
of the state is also conditioned by its history, endowments of its society,
and the vagaries of regional and transnational circumstances. Such a
configuration of frames and forces produces different state forms that,
in turn, have consequences for the seminal project of development.
States come in many guises (see Figure 1.2). For the sake of parsimony, however, one could offer a spectrum that registers five possible
types that vary from, at one extreme, the highly effective, to its opposite, the dead. The primary distinguishing factors include (a) the haleness of each frame; (b) the degree of coordination; and (c) the depth of
interior attachments to fellowship and collective realization.
Since no state is immune to the vicissitudes that result from the
jostling among individuals as well as larger social forces, a quintessential element of human historicity, an integral state is emblematic of
a moment of delicate balance. That is, the cost of the quotidian grind
and its intimidating ambiguities is compensated by efficacious state
actions that replenish a mentality of collective stake-holding and exude
hope. Antonio Gramsci, so existentially and theoretically aware of this
supreme contradiction, reduces the challenge to its basics:
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What is needed for [an integral state]…are men [and women] of sober
mind…who don’t cause an absence of bread in the bakeries, who make
trains run, and who provide the factories with new materials and know
how to turn the produce of the country into industrial produce, who
insure the safety and freedoms of the people…who enable the network
of collective services to function and who do not reduce the people to a
despair and to a horrible carnage.10

Gramsci’s effective state does not only succeed in delivering public
goods but, particularly important, the leadership generates a degree of
moral and intellectual bonding with the citizens. This “organic” affiliation is central to what he calls “hegemony,” or the establishment of the
“national-popular.” Africa has yet to produce an integral state.
If an integral state is the guardian of isonomic polity and general
prosperity, a developmental state is the next best project. In this context,
the state is conspicuously activist in both the improvement of human
capital and the enhancement of the productive forces and national
accumulation. But, as has often been the record, achievements in the
economic and social realms may come at the cost of civic pluralism
and basic liberties. Because the developmental state is primarily driven
by ambition to quickly mollify external and domestic vulnerabilities of
the society, such a singular attention leaves little room for open dissent
and debate. In the end, a developmental state is visibly Janus-faced—
impressive in marshalling resources and building economic capacity,
but relatively less attentive to the creation of an ambience conducive to
republican individuation. Moreover, and in acute cases, heavy disincentives are presented to those who dare to disagree or insist on moral
autonomy.
There are exceptions to the discrepancy between development and
democracy, as the case of Botswana demonstrates. The Botswana state
has been Africa’s premier developmental state. Despite the shackles
inherited from British colonialism, the state qualitatively transformed
its society from a South African labor reserve to one of the fastest
growing economies in the world for the better part of the last 35 years.
Botswana maintained genuine commitment to liberal democracy since
independence. This blending of development and democracy makes
Botswana unique among developmental states. Botswana has some of
the ingredients necessary for establishing an integral state.
Post-apartheid South Africa is a state in transformation. The independent state has strong democratic credentials. Leadership commit-
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ted to democracy is supported and monitored by vibrant civil society.
South Africa is striving hard to undo white economic domination and
to empower the majority in order to sustain its new democracy. This
requires the broadening and deepening of the country’s physical and
social infrastructure. The successful dual transformation of South
Africa will depend on the quality of state management, and how supportive the global economic climate is. The key question in the South
African debate is whether the neo-liberal shift in development policy
will broaden and deepen the market.
A prebendal type is typically preoccupied with the protection and
reproduction of the immediate interests of a regime and its associates. At the same time, the economy becomes a source of personal and
group enrichment, usually in the form of shady rent-seeking, and the
political institutions amount to little more than a haven for personal
privilege. A key feature of a prebendal state is high dependency—a
combination of subservience to external powers, venality, and despotism at home. Unless turned around, and there is time and space
for such action, these liabilities increasingly blunt any developmental
propulsion, creating a general culture of disregard for the common
good. Nigeria was the archetypical prebendal state. However, it degenerated into a predatory institution under successive civilian and military regimes. The cost of predation became exceedingly onerous under
General Abacha’s regime. Consequently, key organs of civil society
struggled against the regime during much of the 1990s. At the end, the
military retreated and a civilian government was elected. Retired General Obasanjo’s leadership of the past decade made some encouraging
attempts in rebuilding public institutions so they may gain legitimacy
and sufficient capacity to meet the development needs of the Nigerian
society. Nonetheless, heavy reliance on rent from oil, ethnic and religious antagonism, and a misappropriation of national wealth continue
to be part of political practice.
The predatory state is synonymous with diabolical politics. When the
prebendal state loses what little functional capacity and stability it had,
alienation mounts apace. No more even a symbol of disordered legitimacy, the last veils of collective belonging drop, and scavenging over
dwindling public resources becomes openly vicious. For the regime,
with an ever-narrowing grid, leadership turns into its antithesis—that
is, cruel selfishness that slides into open criminality. In the meantime,
as decay advances, a mixture of aghastness and hyperanxiety over personal and family survival becomes the paradigm of social and political
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conduct. With the full atrophy of the vital functions of the state, the
centaurs become one-dimensional beasts. Together, these factors dissipate the stock of citizenship and mark the beginnings of the death of
civic virtue. As Maurice Godelier asserts, “without development of the
material and intellectual productive forces, any society risks becoming
gradually and unwittingly stagnant and turning in on itself, becoming
less able to cope with the effects of internal conflicts.” Mobutu’s Zaire,
Taylor’s Liberia, and Mugabe’s current Zimbabwe come to mind as
proximate examples.
Sadly, the predatory state may not be the last stop in the glide
towards optimum degeneration; it can get worse. With heightened
physical and economic insecurity, and the evaporation of public discourse and life, many take flight to anywhere before the final curtain. Those who stay behind are enveloped by a new barbarism, one
defined by a looting of what is left of the commons, further retailing
of identities, and prodigality of terror. Thus spoke Wole Soyinka, as he
reflected on such happenings in parts of the continent:
The land of Syle Cheney-Coker, poet, who declares himself content to be
‘the breakfast of the peasants,’ ‘the hands that help the fishermen bring
in their catch,’ ‘a hand on the plough that tills the fields,’ is silenced. This
land also of the playwright Ulisu Amadu Maddy, of the urbane critic
Eldred Jones, of skilled silver and goldsmiths, of the sublime sculptures
of the Nimba peoples and the timeless lyrics of their griots (a traditional
musician/poet or minstrel), has been turned into a featureless landscape
of rubble, of a traumatized populace and roaming canines among unburied cadavers. How does a sculptor begin to carve with only stumps for
arms? How does a village griot ply his trade with only the root of the
tongue still lodged at the gateway of memory? The rest has been cut
out—often the hand that wields the knife is the hand of the future, the
ubiquitous child-soldier—and the air is bereft even of the solace of its
lament.
A lament can be purifying, consoling, for a lament still affirms the retention of soul, even of faith, yes, it is a cry of loss, of bereavement, an echo
of pain but is, therefore, an affirmation of humanity, a reaching out to
the world that is still human or to forces that shape humanity. A lament
does not emerge from atrocities, for an atrocity is the very silencing
of the human voice. It deadens the soul and clogs up the passages of
hope, opening up in their place only sterile accusations, the resolve of
vengeance, or else a total surrender to the triumph of banality. We can

50

Ahmed I. Samatar

no longer speak of wars on the continent, only arenas of competitive
atrocities.11

The end point of such an experience is the cadaverous state. Every
frame is damaged to such an extreme extent that civic life is, simply
put, no more. An immediate lesson is how easy it is to demolish in
quick time what has taken years to build. The Somali case is an instantiation of this type.
III. History: A Backward Glance12
A review of the evolution of political order and authority in the Somali
context could be periodized into the following: pre-colonial, colonial,
and post-colonial. This section of the essay attempts to offer a highly
compressed account of each, before I move on to the current conjuncture of collective moral and institutional failures.
A. Pre-Colonial Order
The descent of Somali society into mutual hatred and full disintegration, best exemplified by the demise of the state, cannot be understood
solely within the orbit of one isolated factor or another. Rather, the condition is better understood by seeing it as the total shattering of a mode
of being in the world and a companion failure to invent a new one. This
now defunct mode of existence included a lean but sustainable material production and reproduction; a cultural pattern, informed by a
sense of the divine, which portrayed a moral code and common sense;
and a loose political practice marked by local legitimacy and accountability. Buffeted by a compounded mixture of its own shortcomings
and a series of powerful external intrusions, however, the old “form of
life” gradually lost its delicate calibration and grace. No other moment
in contemporary Somali history so somberly reflects such a loss of way
than the killing of civic politics. Here, then, I attempt to: (1) recapture
the substructure and nature of the old order; and (2) identify some of
the major transformations (mostly focused on the state) that could be
associated with the prevailing madness and destruction of virtue.

51

Bildhaan Vol. 7

1. The Constitution of Umma
Somalis of traditional times were not feral creatures, bereft of phronesis,
who roamed lawlessly the range land of the Horn of Africa; on the
contrary, they did create a long time ago a pastoral, and later some
agro-pastoral, political economy based on a thorough awareness of the
vagaries of a very exacting ecosystem. This mode of livelihood, based
on the household and largely self-sufficient, had an intricate division
of labor. For example, womenfolk were primarily responsible for the
management of domestic concerns, including the condition of the portable home or Agal; men dealt most with issues of security, knowledge
about the weather and the range, general welfare of the herd, and
formal relations with the world outside, including relatives. Finally,
young boys and girls were assigned to look after small ruminants grazing around the homestead. Such material existence had some notable
communitarian characteristics that included Miilo (a precise and transparent procedure for fair distribution of water, the most precious of
all resources on the range), agreements on access to pasture, and an
informal but reciprocal claim on each other’s labors. But there was a
downside to these arrangements. For instance, even in a good season,
when the rains and pasture were plentiful, surplus was, at best, meager—turning economic activities into a perpetual effort of living on
the edge. In other words, shortages and hunger were familiar shadows
that haunted the Somali landscape. In the modern era of the late twentieth century—an age of expanding human and livestock populations,
declining ecosystems, and changing appetites and habits of consumption—the old and precarious, if somewhat balanced, material life was
bound to come under great stress.
The economic basis of early Somali society had correlate political
institutions and practices: kinship—a combination of blood-ties and
customary law. Each household, Reer, was led by the oldest male, usually the father or grandfather, who was expected, particularly at a
certain age, to have acquired a degree of competence in local history,
culture, and values. Further, this person was connected to two kinds of
immediate social networks. The first and most primary was the Tol, a
solidarity with male-kin based on a belief in a common male lineage;
the second, though more shallow and of less weight, was based on
marriage ties, or Xidid.
Male-lineage identities performed many positive functions of which
security and the payment of blood-money, Mug, or restitution to an
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injured party, and mutual assistance in hard times like droughts were
paramount. On the other hand, Tol identity was totally exclusive, liable
to group privilege and, in times of high stakes, susceptible to chauvinistic demonization of the “Other.” Xidid, bonding through marriage,
was the first counterweight to the narrowness of Tol in that it expanded
a man’s self-definition by obligating him to his in-laws and the people
of his mother. A second element of kinship was Xeer, an unwritten
code of conduct that set specific guidelines for intra- and inter-kin
transactions. Within the compass of Xeer were the following: preservation of the wisdom of the ages and habits of community, delineation of
obligations and entitlements, and supervision of criminal justice. The
combination of Xidid and Xeer further offset the parochialism of Tol by
enlarging the range of affiliations. The incarnation of the confluence of
those pieces of kinship culture was the elder, one of two foundations of
traditional leadership. In a few larger and somewhat more structured
kin communities, august appellations like Sultan or Ugaas were used.
The other part of the old moral order was Islam. Arriving on the
Somali shores around the tenth century, Islam, through Al-Quran, AlHadith, and Al-Sunnah, infused new and powerful values into the existing Somali cosmology. Among these were a deeper spirituality and a
greater sense of piety. At the worldly level, Islam also brought Qanoon,
a set of laws to guide the behavior of the believers. Much more than
Xeer, Islam extended the margins of the relevant universe by linking
Somalis to a world of co-religionists. The bearer of this new knowledge
and, as a result, the leader in this realm was the Sheikh, the learned
and reverent. Under the aegis of such leaders, the crucial affairs of the
community were discussed in open meetings, Shir. Finally, from the
perspective of the modern world, it is worth registering that the old
Somali order carried the seeds of two essential ingredients of democratic practice: separation of powers and open, participatory deliberations, albeit male-centered. The calibration of the above elements set
the basis of Somali society for a large stretch of its existence. Despite
a rigorous environment with a very modest economic base that frequently created tensions among various kin groups and clashes with
the neighbors (particularly Abyssinians), the Somali people of the Horn
of Africa moved through history with a sense of independence and
confidence. But that situation did not last forever, for new and momentous transformations that will dramatically alter the nature of political
authority and culture were in the offing. I will present a thumbnail
sketch of critical watersheds.
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B. Conquest: The Colonial Order
Somali contact with the outside world did not start with the onset of
colonialism. Earlier, as mercantile trade spread into the Indian Ocean
littoral, coastal towns like Mogadishu, Merca, and Zeila appeared. The
main purveyors of these activities were Middle Eastern and Islamic
merchants. Although the center of gravity of Somali society continued to be located in the interior, or Miyii, the establishment of urban
centers underlined a growing economic and cultural interaction with
other and distant worlds. In short, Muslim traders became the first
bridgeheads in the gradual “incorporation” of Somali society into the
expanding “modern world-system.” New commodities began to find
their way into the hinterland, slowly impacting social relations and
habits. With their new wares and culture of literacy, Middle Eastern
arrivals to the coast began to attract a few Somalis with their inducements. Here was the genesis of the family “middleman” who will
divide his loyalties between the merchants from other lands and kin
group in the countryside.
Whatever was the balance of forces between the urban/coastal towns
and the hinterland, by the closing stages of the nineteenth century, a
new and revolutionary force arrived: multiple colonizers. First there
were the British and the French, and later the Italians, to be joined
at the table for the scramble for Somali territories by the Emperor of
Ethiopia, Menelik. By 1920, despite a fierce resistance on the part of
Somalis led by the legendary Sayyid Mohamed Abdille Hassan, colonial order in five guises was in place. For our purposes, some of the
most visible consequences of the conquest were the following:
• Persuasion of some Somali elders to become clients of the new colonial schemes represented by a governor or district commissioner.
• Intimidation and humiliation, or ultimately dismissal, of those who
failed to comply.
• Appointment of collaborators who were, in large measure, accountable only to the colonial authorities.
• Emerging class differentiation based on lowly bureaucratic appointments, participation in the colonial economy—particularly the
export of livestock from the North—and land expropriation by the
fascists in the riverine areas of the South.
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• Calculated manipulation of differences and disputes among kin
groups, which frequently pitted one group against another and gave
old communal antipathies new combustion.
• Conscious and frequent use of state violence to bring populations to
heel.
• Relegation of Islam to a private affair with little relevance to the
political order.
• Decoupling of the operational side of the state from a sense of righteousness and inclusive community.
• Total defeat of Somalis by turning them into subjects of five different colonial administrations.
Nearly half a century after the consolidation of colonialism, nationalist forces taking the inspiration from the heroism of the Dervish
movement of Sayyid Mohamed Abdille Hassan, a general awakening
of other subjugated societies, and emboldened by a moral as well as
material weakening of the colonial metropole due to the circumstances
surrounding the Second World War, won their campaign for independence. Precisely, on July 1, 1960, British Somaliland and Italian Somalia
joined together to become the new Somali Republic, leaving the other
three (Djibouti, the Ogaden, and the NFD) under foreign rule.
C. The Post-Colonial State
Typical of African decolonization, the Somali post-colonial state came
into the world draped in sharp contradictions. On the one hand, it
effused a populist temper that promised both a retrieval of collective
honor and peoplehood, and a quick march towards socio-economic
development. On the other hand, there was very little understanding,
particularly on the part of most of the new leadership and regimes, of
the complexities of domestic reconstitution, let alone the difficulties
inherent in profitably engaging a bi-polar international system.
Within a few years, the glow of independence began to dim. In fact,
as early as 1961, signs of regional discontent appeared when a group of
mutinous junior military officers from the North took over Hargeisa.
In that same year, in a referendum, a very thin majority of the Northerners voted against the constitution, which was designed to become
the basis of the new polity. On both occasions, a component of the
Northern elite saw the new dispensation as biased towards the South.

55

Bildhaan Vol. 7

Looking at the distribution of the senior political leadership, regime
portfolios, high echelons of the new bureaucracy, and other state apparatuses, as well as the concentration of most significant decision-making in Mogadishu, the seeds of regional jealousy and suspicion were
planted—to be a lasting source of exploitation by a few ambitious
individuals. Furthermore, while investments were made in a few agricultural and educational projects, serious socio-economic development
was left on the back burner. Those early years, then, set the basis for
three characteristics that will define a considerable part of the civilian
tenure of the post-colonial state: relentless competition among a narrow elite over the spoils of the state through reckless looting of a very
precarious economy; fixation on liberating the other three Somali territories; and a desperate search for international patrons that will supply
both economic and military aid.
The one exceptional but brief moment was between 1964 and 1967.
Those four years are now overwhelmingly regarded by both Somalis
and others informed about the country’s political history as an interlude of extraordinary leadership as a result of the combined ethical
resoluteness and diligent demeanor of President Aden A. Osman and
Premier Abdirazak H. Hussein. Between them, they set competence
and probity as the signature tune in the conduct of the state. Meditating on the disheartening history of governance in Somalia over the past
three-and-a-half decades, one of the country’s most respected senior
civil servants, Ali Said Araleh, testified thus:
Aden was so strict with the taxpayers’ money that he saved enough from
the presidency annual budget to build a presidential retreat in Afgoi,
while others were pocketing public money. For instance, Prime Minister
Egal used public revenue to build his private villa (Villa Baidoa) on the
road to Afgoi. Prime Minister Abidirazak’s respect for the law and his
anti-corruption effort has no parallel in our history. His hands are absolutely untainted and the two are peerless as Somali leaders.13

In those yesteryears of civilian order, obsession with winning a
seat in parliament turned electoral politics into a fractious business in
which over sixty parties were registered for 123 seats in 1969. Further,
office-holding became a license for indulgence in Musuq Maasaq, that
is, corruption and unethical behavior. The second item made the population somewhat schizophrenic in that the very regimes that were so
offensive to them were, in the same breath, asking of them to mobilize
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selflessly for a continuation of the nationalist struggle. The third issue
set Somalia on its reputation as a beggar nation, heavily reliant on
external contributions to both the annual budget and the financing of
development expenditures. It also drove the whole region into the vortex of Superpower competition. By 1969, nine years of civilian incompetence and malfeasance culminated in the assassination of President
Sharmarkee, testimony to the widening gulf between the state and
society. A few days later, the military stepped in.
General Siyaad Barre’s regime’s tenure (1969–1990) can be divided
into two broad periods: 1969–1979 and 1980–1990. Siyaad Barre and
his cohorts (the Somali Revolutionary Council or SRC) came to power
with the promise of eliminating corruption, rebuilding the economy
and social institutions, returning to a genuine democratic governance,
and a re-enchantment of the sense of national purpose. The first few
years were notable for a number of bold initiatives. For instance, an
official orthography was set for the Somali language, accompanied
by a successful literacy campaign. New schools and roads were built,
cooperative farms were established, and laws affirming the equality
of women were introduced. All in all, despite an expansive nationalization of economic activity and the public shooting of two very
senior SRC colleagues of Siyaad Barre and ten theologians, the regime
enjoyed a modicum of popularity up to the middle of the decade.
The years from 1975 to 1978 were determinative. Nationalization
bred new forms of cronyism and inefficiencies that began to enervate
productivity and transactions, compelling many to withdraw from the
official economy. Relationship with the Soviet Union and its allies had
developed into a tighter embrace, with more military equipment pouring into Somalia and, in the process, creating one of the largest armed
forces in Black Africa. Further, the rhetoric about socialist democracy
began to wear thin and voices of dissent started to speak about what
they saw as the emergence of a harsh state and sycophantic politics. By
mid-1977, with the Ethiopian regime of Col. Mengistu still reeling from
gruesome internal power struggles, Somali forces in combination with
guerillas of the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF) mounted a
surprise and initially successful attack on the Somali-inhabited region
of Ethiopia. They captured almost all of the Ogaden, except the three
large cities of Jigjiga, Harar, and Dire Dawa. By early 1978, the Soviets had shifted their allegiance to Ethiopia. Together with Cuban and
South Yemeni troops and new Soviet weapons, the Ethiopians counterattacked. Within a short time, the Somalis were decimated and then
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compelled to withdraw. By all accounts, the cost was enormous. In
addition to the loss of thousands of lives, the war generated high inflation, as well as made the face of state power more militaristic. In the
wake of intense recriminations that followed, a group of military officers staged a bloody but unsuccessful coup. The year 1979 closed with
no external patron, deteriorating economic conditions, large refugee
populations, serious damage to regime credibility, and the appearance
of organized dissidence claiming the loyalties of their respective kin
groups. Siyaad Barre and the regime responded by manipulating kinbased identities and, worse than the colonial administrations, pitted
one segment of society against another, while the state was turned into
a fortress. At this juncture, the Somali state clearly showed the same
maladies that Clapham identified in many countries on the continent:
The rapid increase in the militarization of Sub-Saharan Africa from
the mid-1970s onwards was a response, not simply to external developments, but to the desperate attempts of autocratic states to impose
themselves on increasingly rebellious populations. The result, generally speaking, was to accelerate the process of state decay, while vastly
increasing the cost in human suffering.14

The period from 1980 to 1990 was the decade of real decay, unprecedented repression, civil war, and final dissolution. Despite aid from the
new Reagan Administration, including military training and supplies,
the economy got worse. Here, the most onerous of the burdens fell on
the farming communities of the lands in between and adjacent to the
Shabelle and Juba rivers. For instance, tensions between customary
land tenure and post-colonial state interventions in the form of leaseholding became acute. In addition, as the urban economy—including
salaries and other amenities of state offices—declined precipitously,
political power was deployed to arbitrarily grab pieces of land in these
riverine zones. In many situations, this was tantamount to a full dispossession of the tillers of the land whose generations of intensive labor
made these regions into the most productive parts of Somalia. But
economic suffering was not limited to the southern regions. In many
parts of the North, a growing privatization of the common range, more
permanent settlements, and supervision of communal practices of land
use had pressed hard on the environment. In addition, by the end of
the 1980s a combination of highly top-heavy state decisions, mounting
and commodified economic activities, and changing habits of everyday
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life had created new and dramatic circumstances. An extensive study
in even remote Erigavo District underscores these transformations. It is
worthy of extensive quotation.
The development of a cash economy, coupled with the remittances from
the Gulf in terms of goods-in-kind for animals sold there, has meant that
the average pastoralist now has greater access to consumer items such
as mass-produced cooking utensils and clothing. Also now more readily
available are substitute foods, in particular white flour and white rice.
The pastoral women claimed that to a large extent these new foods were
substituted for their traditional diet, based on meat and sorghum. This
change in customary diet, while convenient for pastoralists as the new
foods can be easily stored and transported, had a negative nutritional
impact. The new foods are significantly lower in iron and the B vitamins
than the traditional meat and sorghum diet… . The Erigavo District has
the dubious distinction of recording one of the highest maternal mortality rates in the world, a trend which could be markedly reversed if a
return to the traditional diet could be achieved.15

New IMF structural adjustment policies triggered the devaluation of
the shilling by more than 90 percent, further cutbacks in state employment and social spending, and a worsening trade balance. In 1985, the
national debt climbed to the tune of US $1 billion. Further, armed dissidents started to mount guerrilla-style challenges, crippling the reach
of the authority of the state. The momentous year was 1988 when the
forces of the Somali National Movement (SNM) crossed from their
bases in Ethiopia and fought their way into some of the major centers in northwestern Somalia, including Hargeisa. A fierce engagement
ensued in which the full military weight of the state was unleashed on
mostly Isaaq-inhabited zones of the region. Thousands were killed,
two of the towns heavily damaged—Hargeisa with the help of aerial
bombardment—and tens of thousands hurried across the border in
search of refuge in Ethiopia.
These events awakened the world to what was happening in Somalia. Consequently, international aid, including nearly $680 million from
the United States, began to dry up, further isolating the regime. In
1989, rebellion spread to many areas of the South. Siyaad Barre, in a
last-ditch effort to salvage his authority, sent more weapons to his kin
and cronies while at the same time doubling his efforts to weaken the
opposition through greater exploitation of lineage differences. By the
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end of the year, the capital and a few other urban centers were under
the effective rule of the regime.
In January 1991, Mogadishu itself exploded. After a month of handto-hand combat between the last remnants of the fully clanized Somali
army and the forces of the United Somali Congress (USC), who had
a large following in the capital, the regime expired. Thousands died,
and Siyaad Barre escaped to the territory of his kin, leaving behind a
ruined country and people.
IV. Dissolution and Political Squalor
From 1991 to the present could be best characterized as years of misanthropy, blood-letting, greater destruction of whatever was left of the
elements of the national state, massive and concentrated starvation,
the break-up of the North and South, failed international intervention, continuing exodus from the country, and a generalized existential
bleakness, especially for the majority inside the country.
As soon as Siyaad Barre fled, the leader of the civilian wing of the
USC, Ali Mahdi Mohamed, was declared the interim president. Two
immediate consequences followed: (1) General Aideed, the chairman
of the USC and commander of their fighting forces, was quick to anathematize the act as an unwarranted and unilateral power grab; and (2)
he threw a gauntlet by announcing himself to be the rightful person to
assume the office. These developments destabilized the already fragile
alliance within the Hawiye lineage group, which was predominant
around the environs of the capital. In the meantime, other armed organizations, or Jabhad, around the country, of which there were no less
than a dozen, made their own counterclaims. Personal ambition combined with assumed representation of local interests, and the disappearance of central authority, gave aspiring individuals confidence to
press for any advantage.
To compress, in quick time other developments transpired. First,
some of the better organized and armed kin groups declared war
on the USC and, subsequently, helped spread the post-Siyaad Barre
atrocities to many areas of the South. Second, the SNM proclaimed
the northern region a new sovereign state—the Republic of Somaliland. Third, Mogadishu entered its second and longest phase of mayhem and savagery. Since the capital was the premium, the Mahdi and
Aideed forces went at each other with unrestrained ferocity. Simultaneously, thousands of armed hungry men and derelict youth gangs
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roamed the streets and neighborhoods, pillaging with great abandon.
Fourth, hundreds of thousands were made destitute and displaced,
causing greater movements of people inside the country and across
the borders to the neighboring countries and beyond. Fifth, with a total
lack of security and disruption of economic activities, particularly in
the agricultural zones of the South, widespread hunger turned into a
carnival of starvation.
Offended and alarmed by vivid pictures of suffering and grim news
from Somalia, in early December 1992, a multinational force of over
34,000 troops (of which 24,000 were Americans) landed on the beaches
of Mogadishu. By mid-1993, the immediate goal of delivering food to
the starving was accomplished. However, other objectives like disarmament of clan militias, inception of a national dialogue, and rebuilding of basic public institutions proved very difficult.
The United Nations, which took over command of the multinational
forces as well as the political mission, convened a number of high-profile conferences among the more than one dozen factions and a few
representatives from other segments of the society. While these meetings came to be generally known for bizarre disagreements and petty
jealousies among the participants, General Aideed became the most
obdurate of them all. In addition, during the summer and autumn of
1993, two ugly and jarring events took place. First, on June 5, twentytwo U.S. troops were killed and more wounded, while dozens of Somalis lost their lives. The day after, the body of one of the dead Americans
was dragged through the streets. In the wake of all this, a general consensus was reached that Somalis had had their chance and, therefore,
they should be left to their own devices. President Clinton set March
31, 1994, for complete American withdrawal, with the U.N. mandate to
end soon after.
A. Regional Particularities
If the last sixteen years were, quintessentially, a time of further descent
into internecine warfare, destructive claims and counterclaims by
somewhat known as well as obscure clanists, and international bewilderment, it has also been a time of some dramatic changes. Among the
latter was the appearance of regionalist identities, partly as a logical
extension of the confluence of the death of the national state, the rising
prominence of genealogical affinities, and even narrower individualist
subtexts that always hid in the inner folds of identity politics. The two
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most pronounced examples of arguments for regional distinctiveness
were: North (Somaliland) and Northeast (Puntland).

1. North (Somaliland)
This was, and still is, the most extreme of any advocacy for regional
particularity. Founded on the assumption that the post-colonial Somali
Republic was no more, proponents of this new entity (primarily incited
by an agitated and armed wing of the SNM) declared the secession of
the region from the rest of the country in Burao in May 1991. A careful inquiry into the atmosphere surrounding the event shows that,
in addition to the horrible developments taking place in Mogadishu,
the Burao declaration was endorsed by those present (non-SNM) not
because they were sold on the value of the idea but as a temporary
acquiescence to prevent immediate bloodshed and to buy time for a
return to noncoercive and democratic deliberations over the direction of the politics of the region. To date, that communal-wide and
free conversation among the people of the area has not taken place.
The only relevant act worth mentioning, in this context, is the conduct
of an abruptly arranged constitutional referendum on May 31, 2001.
Though it was reported that 97 percent of the votes cast endorsed
the constitutional basis for an “independent Somaliland,” it became
quickly evident that: (a) active encouragement and menacing discouragement dominated the atmosphere—that is, on the eve of the voting,
enthusiastic mobilization was accorded those in favor of secession in
contradistinction to intimidating pressures on dissenters, and (b) a
boycotting by the communities of the eastern zone of the region was
staged, a disaffection that has turned into defiant and bloody resistance in this portion of the territory.
Despite the above, this region has produced significant accomplishments, superior to any other initiatives in other parts of Somalia.16 First,
and most noteworthy, is the creation of an indigenously constructed
modus operandi among the various communities, which has resulted in
a modicum of order. Second, rudimentary political structures of governance are in place. Here, the main units are: executive, legislature, and
judiciary. The executive comprises a President and Vice President (and
their appointed cabinet) directly elected through a general election
for a five-year term. The legislature is made up of a Council of Representatives and a small Council of Elders (the former is elected every
five years; the latter every six years). Third, competition for electoral
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office is channeled through competitive party politics. Fourth, a small
but still growing proportion of children is attending school. Fifth, the
rhythm of daily material existence and minimum economic transactions, particularly in urban areas (albeit overwhelmingly buoyed by
overseas remittances), are visible.
Notwithstanding these commendable accomplishments, there are
worrisome issues. First, there are still many small arms in the hands
of individuals or households. Second, on balance, the exodus of talent
continues, as there are no major sources of employment. Third, with
a puny (less than $30 million) annual budget and an absence of any
external productive investment, severe impoverishment is common
among the vast majority. Fourth, there is a visible return to the corrupt
habits of the old and dead order—witnesses to such a reversion are the
total dominance of the capital, Hargeisa, over the rest and the appearance of a commensurate sociopolitical class that monopolizes major
decisions and privileges. Fifth, apostasy with regard to the sanctity of
national unity is promoted while any advocacy for the preservation of
the national union is criminalized. Here, there is a calculated “othering” of Somalis from outside of the region in order to deepen suspicion
and, thus, create a new identity. Sixth, thus far political appointments
have been profligate (e.g., a 40-member cabinet), ignoring the yawning
discrepancy between, on one side, the necessity of parsimony and effectiveness and, on the other, an irresponsible use of very meager public
resources. Seventh, despite nearly a decade and a half of campaigning
for international acceptance, no state has yet extended recognition to a
new sovereignty called Somaliland. Eighth, the elite in Hargeisa have
tied their own interests to the strategic designs of Ethiopia to such an
extent that, as I write, there are no reports of any public outcry over the
invasion of Ethiopian troops deep into the central regions of the South
and the capital. Perhaps this is a measure of how deeply beholden to
Ethiopian suzerainty are the region’s political class and their cause.
To recapitulate, the people of Northern Somalia (Somaliland) have
made achievements worthy of note and deserving of further enthusiastic support. This is a source of victory and pride that I have called guul.
However, the damages done are also substantial. Among the latter
stands out the sectarian and instrumentalist ambition to secede that, in
the act, degrades and then tears up national belonging, a phenomenon
I have designated as godob. If used wisely, the transitional period ought
to be an opportunity for the people within the region, as well as the
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rest, to explore the possibilities for a new and workable political dispensation and governance.

2. Northeast (Puntland)
Like the rest of the country, the people of the Northeastern region found
themselves caught in the aftermath of the implosion of the Siyaad
Barre government and the demise of the national state. Subsequently, a
dual yet connected struggle ensued: on one side was the release of personal and political venom as well as ambition to grab local power; on
the other was the collective urge to pick up the responsibilities for the
general well-being of the region. Compounded by the arrival of large
numbers of people fleeing from Mogadishu or getting out of refugee
camps in other zones, the challenge of balancing narrow political interests, new religious militancy, and broad civic imperatives ended in
violent encounters and instability, particularly between 1991 and 1998
(five administrations in seven years!). The primary responsibility for
this failure was attributed to the then dominant political organization,
the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), and its leadership. In
addition, the United Somali Congress made its own forceful sectarian
claims to the southern part of the region.
On July 23, 1998, in the wake of many months of multiple communal discussions and infighting, the region was given a new name,
“Puntland State,” with its charter to consecrate the decision. In August
of 1998, a regional executive committee of nine ministers was named,
to be followed by a regional assembly of sixty-nine members.
The Northeast’s new government is different from that of the North
in one crucial point: the former declared itself to be no more than an
autonomous part of a united Somalia; the latter is still categorical in
the intention to secede. As for deficiencies, there are many. First, the
Northeast’s material resource base is even more limited. With very low
annual rainfall, for instance, there are no known areas suitable for any
type of farming. Outside of the main city of Bosaaso, where the port is
the focal point of some import/export transactions, and a few smaller
urban enclaves, there are hardly any other significant sources of local
employment. Like the North, what there is of investment comes primarily from remittances from the people of the region who have sought
and continue to look for refuge in other parts of Africa and beyond.
Second, until a few years ago, the politics of the region was bedeviled
by elements of the old leadership of the SSDF (particularly in the form
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of Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf), who insisted through violent acts on
keeping political power to themselves. With Yusuf’s attention focused
in the last few years on how to salvage his Siyaad Barre-like obsession
with personal rule in the hapless Transitional Federal Government,
the Northeast is relatively more stable. Given the feeble nature of the
power and reach of the regional institutions, however, the coast of
“Puntland” has become a haven for local pirates. Such criminal activities are known to be disruptions to maritime law and freedom of the
seas. Therefore, international counteraction (particularly in the form
of the presence of the United States Navy) is part of the oceanscape.
Third, “Puntland” is embroiled in a simmering contest with “Somaliland” over the boundaries of the eastern zones of the latter. Propelled
by both a clanist ideology that sees the kin groups of Sool and Sanaaq
as belonging to an identity called Harti and with the active encouragement of some of the denizens of the two local communities, political leadership in “Puntland” has militarily clashed with the authority
of the North, poisoning in the process the relationship between the
two regions. Fourth, the southern settlements (e.g., Galkayo) of the
Northeast are peopled by diverse kin communities, which, in times of
incompetent and sectarian leadership, easily divide themselves into
highly belligerent camps. Here, both the fissiparous reputation of the
leadership and an absence of significant representation from the kin
communities of the southern border areas diminish legitimacy and
effectiveness. The new military collaboration between Ethiopian forces
and Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf’s militia, which had culminated in the
invasion of the southern parts of the country and the bloody engagements in Mogadishu, could only wreck any modicum of good will
existing between communities sharing settlements or borders, especially in the North and the central areas.
If the North and the Northeast have been, relatively, zones of a
return of some order, with the adoption of some constitutional procedures and attempts at building public institutions, then the rest of
Somalia, until the now temporary rise of the UIC, has been mired in
bloody underdevelopment. Unable to see through the trap of “othering” and compounded by the diversity of communities (an asset in
times of peace and the construction of a cosmopolitan culture) and the
allure of capturing the capital and urban centers as well as laying claim
to the rich farmland between rivers, these regions have been theaters
for vicious “warlord” appetites. For many keen observers, it is in these
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parts of the country (primarily from Mogadishu to Kismayo) where
the cost of dissolution to the Somali people has been the greatest.
B. Attempts at Reconciliation and the Revival of the State}17
Since 1991, over a dozen gatherings, sponsored by different elements
of the international society, were convened to bring representation
from various groups. The declared purpose of all of these conferences
was to restore peace and national authority. Two of them stand out
among the rest for being at once promising and utterly disappointing.

1. Arta: A Betrayal of a Gift
Warlords and factional leaders dominated each of the eleven conferences before Arta. All failed to produce consensus, as each selfappointed warlord was adamant on insisting to be the rightful
candidate for the presidency of the country. As a result, most Somalis
submitted to the prospect of not seeing a national state in their lifetime.
The bleakness of the predicament proved so paralyzing that it would
fall to the partially Somali-populated small Republic of Djibouti and
its leader to recharge hopes of saving Somalia from itself. Ismail Omar
Gaileh, with the zest that accompanies a new presidency, coupled with
his own primordial affinity with the Somali people, made a personal
assignment of the pressing necessities of reducing regional instability
and Djibouti’s immediate vulnerabilities.
With his surprise announcement at the U.N. General Assembly in
1999 to convene a different gathering to rebuild Somalia, President
Gaileh put the full energy of his administration behind the endeavor.
So it was that this meeting of Somalis took place in Djibouti in March
2000. A series of workshops were conducted for a month. Traditional
leaders, businessmen, women, intellectuals, and others were invited.
Most significantly, warlords were also extended a welcome, but not
as veto holders. All in all, nearly 5,000 delegates came from every
region to deliberate the future of their country. Predictably, most of
the more self-important warlords stayed away; they complained that
they were devalued by not being treated as the preeminent leaders
of their respective communities. In response, the Djibouti hosts reinstated their welcome as individual participants, equal to the rest and,
therefore, with no a priori privileged role. While the Government of
Djibouti provided modest facilities and acted as a fair broker, the key

66

Ahmed I. Samatar

actors were Somali “traditional” leaders and former politicians. One
moment in the proceedings is etched in the memory of those who were
present: negotiations came to a halt when sharp conflicting interests
clashed. Fearful that the whole conference was in danger of collapse,
Gaileh intervened by appealing to the delegates to consider their collective interest. In an emotionally charged tone, he pleaded, “Somaliyee
ii hiiliya aan idiin hiiliye” (O Somalis, help me so that I can help you).
The appeal moved the delegates and broke the logjam. Afterwards,
the key obstacle proved to be the selection of the official delegates to
the conference who, ultimately, were to choose a new parliament of
245 deputies. The formula for working out the distribution of the seats
was set at dividing the nation into 4.5 communities. In the meantime, a
national transitional charter was drafted which the delegates approved
and the provisional parliament later adopted. Perhaps the most daunting task was how to equitably parcel out the parliamentary seats within
each community. This milestone was reached after some acute wrangling and, subsequently, Somalia’s first “democratically” selected chamber of deputies was put into place. Moreover, the chamber proceeded
to elect an interim president from several competing candidates. These
developments took place without notable interference from the Djibouti Government; and, critical to note, none of the defeated candidates expressed any doubt that the host government was anything but
impartial. In short, the Arta reconciliation conference brought achievements that seemed farfetched only a few months earlier. The Somali
public, on the whole, responded with a conspicuous sense of relief,
elation, and anticipation. In short, though not immune to intrigues
among the delegates and their hangers-on, Arta seemed, in the words
of the ancient poet Horace, “not to draw smoke from the brightness of
light,” as others before it had done, “but to bring out light from smoky
murk.” What would result from this initial success depended on the
caliber of the new leadership, its reception in Mogadishu and the rest
of the country, and the attitude of the neighboring countries, particularly Ethiopia.
Interim President Abdiqasim Salad and his entourage made an
unplanned visit to the ruined capital. Despite the chaos, hundreds of
thousands came out to celebrate what they hoped to be the beginning
of a peaceful era. But the promise soon tumbled as the Transitional
National Government (TNG) was hobbled by a combination of Ethiopian-cum-warlord subversion, the clanistic formula (4.5) used to set
representation, and the inherent defects of the new team.
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The first signal of trouble was the transparently unhappy presence
of the Ethiopian Prime Minister, Meles Zenawi, among the dignitaries during the inaugural ceremony to congratulate Abdiqasim Salad.
In retrospect, Zenawi’s attendance belied his hidden agenda of what
he desired to become of Somalia. Salad immediately dispatched an
envoy to visit Addis Ababa to relay that the new Somali Government
was intent on collaborating closely with its neighbors and strengthening positive relations between Somalia and Ethiopia. Later, several
other expeditions were sent to emphasize Somali perspectives, but
every delegation met with Ethiopian skepticism. Within six months,
the Ethiopian strategy became clear. It at once started to stress the
incompleteness of the peace process since the warlords were absent,
and also declared that Islamists of the Al-Itihaad orientation dominated
the interim government. In response, Salad and his cohorts made several attempts to demonstrate otherwise and to reassure the Ethiopian
leadership. However, the situation deteriorated to a point of no return
when Ethiopia accused Salad himself of being a member of Al-Itihaad.
From then on, Addis Ababa adopted a four-pronged strategy to destabilize and delegitimate the TNG. First, Ethiopia convened a meeting
for the warlords and, in the process, helped establish an umbrella
structure for them, to be named the Somali Reconciliation and Reconstruction Council (SRRC). Second, Ethiopia increased military supplies
for members of the group. Third, Ethiopia actively lobbied at the OAU
(now AU) and other international organizations to unseat the TNG. In
this context, Ethiopia gave more encouragement to the self-proclaimed
“Somaliland Republic” to enhance the latter’s search for recognition
as an independent country while simultaneously repeating platitudes
about the unity and territorial integrity of the Somali Republic at public forums, such as the assembly of the Heads of State and Governments of the Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD)
in Eldoret and, more recently, at the AU meeting in Maputo. Finally,
Ethiopia intensified its campaign at the IGAD forum to convene an
IGAD-sponsored conference to “complete” the Arta process.
In the eyes of some, perhaps the conference’s greatest weakness
was the working assumption that both clan identity and its associated numerical weight were to be the mechanism for representation.
Many communities were alienated by the use of what they saw as an
ill-founded and atavistic formula. In the meantime, the weaknesses of
the TNG leadership were exposed. First to come to the fore was the
fact that both the interim President (Mr. Abdiqasim Salad), and the
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Prime Minister (Dr. Ali Kalif Galyedh), as well as many of the cabinet
appointees, were remnants of the Siyaad era. Having failed to publicly atone for that association undermined any popular hope for the
beginning of a new political history. Second, no broad vision, let alone
a specific one, was articulated for a national mobilization fit for the
difficulties of the interregnum. Third, hardly any attention was paid
to competence or integrity in the appointment of a new team, reviving memories of the vulgar and cheap horse-trading that crippled the
old Somali national state. Fourth, no immediate tactics, never mind
a strategy, were conceived to reach and win over the large and relatively talented diaspora communities. Fifth, no quick advantage was
taken of the international community, which was admittedly tired of
Somali insouciance toward their national well-being but which may
have become genuinely responsive to a mature, collective, and intelligent plea from a new and legitimate Somali leadership. Sixth, Salad
and Galyedh clashed and then turned on each other. Salad accused
Galyedh of arrogance, a deficit of dexterity, and, most damaging, malfeasance, while the latter labeled the former as power-hungry and dictatorial. With barely half of the three-year term of TNG gone, and after
a parliamentary vote of no confidence, Galyedh was dismissed while
abroad. The TNG’s tenure of three years ended without a single lasting
achievement. Meditating on the utter disappointment in the autumn of
2005, and with an eye on the current developments, President Gaileh
attributed the main and constant cause of the failure of leadership to
a “preoccupation with grabbing as much money as possible and as
quickly, even before any new governance is fully installed.”18

2. Eldoret and Mbagathi: Corruption and Ethiopian-Warlord Axis
Ethiopia’s lobby at the OAU/AU failed, but its efforts at IGAD paid
off. Members of the organization agreed to launch a Somali conference
managed by what came to be dubbed “frontline states,” comprised of
Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Kenya (the last country acting as Chair). Under
enormous international pressure, the TNG and the Djibouti Government agreed to this proposal. Moreover, the TNG assumed the neutrality of Kenya. Sadly, this naïve presumption enabled Ethiopia and
representatives of the international community to change the nature
of the conference from one of reconciling the TNG and the warlords
to a completely new one. The generation of lists representing three
groups—the TNG, the warlords, and civil society—and the appoint-
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ment of a Kenyan, E. Mwangle, well known for his proclivities toward
venality, set the stage for a disheveled and Ethiopian-dominated process. The earliest alert that this was not a neutral approach transpired
when the names of individuals in the civil society group whom Ethiopia deemed unfriendly were expunged from the list of participants.
Furthermore, when members of the international community suggested that the conference needed Somali resource persons, Chairman
Mwangle (Kenya’s special envoy) submitted the list to warlords for
their approval. They rejected it, and, consequently, this act gave them
the confidence to thwart further conference deliberations that were not
to their liking. The international representatives reintroduced the list
to the IGAD Technical Committee. Once the Ethiopian delegation realized that the list could not be vetoed, they argued for an expansion by
adding five names they felt were amenable to their agenda. As a result,
the list of resource persons grew to nearly twenty. This proved to
be quantitatively too cumbersome. Therefore, it was agreed that both
Ethiopia’s and Djibouti’s additions would be put aside. In spite of this
consensus, however, Chairman Mwangle made no attempt to call in
the resource persons to the conference. Moreover, he never convened a
meeting for those among the group who were already in Eldoret.
When the conference commenced, non-Somalis started to make the
agenda. In one instance, an American doctoral student presented the
points, which comprised the key items in the rules of procedure and
the declaration of the cessation of hostilities. Among them was the
establishment of a federal system of governance, a crucial issue in which
Somalis did not have any say. In addition, the “mediators,” including
the graduate student who held the title of “advisor” to the Chair, created warlord-dominated “leaders’ committees” as the paramount decision-making organs of the conference. Again, there was no input from
either the Somalis (outside of the warlords) or those who study Somali
society. The upshot of all these compounded occurrences was that
Ethiopia and its allies continued to try to gerrymander both the composition and quantity of the delegates. The final list of the participants
in the plenary sessions was finalized as a newly elected government
of Kenya appointed a new envoy (and Chair) to the conference. Furthermore, in January, the site was moved to Mbagathi, on the outskirts
of Nairobi. At that stage, representatives of the international community and other observers confirmed that Ethiopia single-handedly controlled two-thirds of the list of conference participants.
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Previously serving in senior diplomatic posts as well as top civil servant positions in Kenya’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ambassador B.
Kiplagat came with a clean reputation; that is, a degree of professionalism in a postcolonial Kenya known for the opposite. This appointment
injected a sense of hope into the proceedings and Somalis expected
him to behave as an honest mediator, one who would correct past misdeeds. Ambassador Kiplagat moved quickly to restore propriety to the
process by relocating the conference to a cheaper location housed in a
college rather than in an expensive hotel in Eldoret.
The first real test came with a contest over the nature of the list
of participants, and the differentiation between the pirates and the
legitimate individuals who represented civic communities. Unfortunately, Ambassador Kiplagat failed to take action, for he seemed barely
knowledgeable of the Somali problem, his superb diplomatic skills
notwithstanding. Such a shortcoming emboldened those whose project was to have their own instrumentally advantageous way. Most
significantly, the warlords and their Ethiopian backers felt ensconced
in their dominant role. But the issue of legitimacy could not be easily
avoided, and Ambassador Kiplagat had to find a way to come to terms
with it. Subsequently, he took the initiative of bringing forth a list of
“traditional leaders” whom he intended to invite to the conference.
This the warlords rejected, demonstrating three pivotal factors: (1) the
Ambassador’s lack of knowledge about Somali culture and his unwillingness to seek counsel from informed Somalis (traditional leaders are
not subjects of anyone in communal affairs, let alone warlords); (2) the
degree of power ceded to the warlords since the inception of the conference; and (3) the significance of Ethiopian partisanship in distorting
the negotiations. The puzzling question, then, was this: Why would a
civic-minded and religious man acquiesce to the chicanery of people
loyal only to their caprices (with criminal records to boot) and their
patrons, allowing them to gain so much potency under his gaze? A
plausible explanation was revealed when, on one occasion, the Ambassador confided in another diplomat that he “did not want to fight Ethiopia.” This sentiment was reinforced by another statement he shared
with a keen observer of the conference to the effect that the interests of
Ethiopia and Kenya should be looked after during the conference.
Ethiopia and warlord dominance took a slight dip when Ambassador Kiplagat appointed an independent Somali group to harmonize
the documents produced by the conference’s six functional committees. The Ethiopian envoy and his deputy were alarmed when the
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Chairperson of the Harmonization Committee, Professor Abdi Ismail
Samatar, was introduced. The Ambassador claimed that Samatar was
“partisan,” and therefore ought to be excluded. This line of argument
did not convince the rest of IGAD’s Technical Committee, which compelled Ethiopia to change its tactics. Ethiopia proposed that if Samatar
was approved as Chair, Ethiopia should be given the opportunity to
name Samatar’s deputy. This demand was turned down. It is important to note here that neither Kenya nor Djibouti demanded the same
privilege. From there on, Ethiopia and its clients focused their energy
on how to derail the Harmonization Committee’s work, and warned
that they would not accept the Committee’s report. Ambassador Kiplagat found himself in a tight spot. He tried to mend fences with Ethiopia
and the warlords by suggesting that the Chairs and Vice-Chairs of the
six committees join the Harmonization team. But soon the Ambassador
realized that the quality of the work would suffer, as these additions
were bound to bring their disagreements into the task of harmonizing
the documents.
The Harmonization Committee handed its report to the chairman
of the IGAD Technical Committee, and, after two minor changes, he
requested that the document be presented to a full gathering of the
entire Technical Committee and official representatives from the international community. Immediately, the Ethiopian emissaries walked
out of the meeting, before reading the report or hearing its verbal
presentation. Nonetheless, the discussion proceeded and the remaining members of the Technical Committee and international partners
commended the overall professional quality of the Harmonization
Report and, more particularly, the draft charter that could cater to the
common interest of the Somali people. Despite the news that, when it
became public, Somalis inside and outside the country were enthusiastically receptive to the Harmonization Committee’s document, Ethiopian representatives began to discredit the draft charter and egged on
their clients to resist it. The Ethiopian ambassador accused Professor
Abdi Samatar of being a “traitor” and anti-Ethiopian. But he failed
to articulate both the reasons behind the charges and the connection
between the Harmonization Report and Ethiopia. After all, the peace
process was for Somalia and not concerned, at least at this stage, with
Somali-Ethiopian relations!
Later, the warlords attempted to produce their own version of the
charter, but brought out a one-page document that addressed only
three articles (the Harmonization Committee’s draft charter had 120
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articles). When this proposal did not convince anyone, they put forward a version of the draft charter favorable to their interests. Eighteen
warlords signed a cover letter to Ambassador Kiplagat in which they
openly stated that their version alone should be presented to the plenary of the conference. If not, they threatened, they would walk out of
the peace process altogether. There were six issues that distinguished
the perspective of the warlords and the draft charter forwarded by the
Harmonization Committee. First, the harmonization document had
120 articles while the warlords’ contained 60 articles. Second, the warlords stipulated that the proposed interim parliament should have a
total of 450 members; the Harmonization Committee suggested 171.
Third, the warlords asked for an open-ended size of the executive portfolios of the new government; the other specified that cabinet appointments should not exceed thirteen. Fourth, the warlords demanded that
a federal form of governance be adopted immediately; the other preferred that a national constitutional commission be given the responsibility of developing a federal constitution and determining what the
constituent units should be. Fifth, and most critically, the warlords
proposed that they themselves select members of the new parliament.
The implications of such an idea meant that unelected delegates in
the conference’s plenary would automatically become deputies and,
moreover, the warlords would nominate the remaining fifty-nine MPs.
In contrast, the harmonized charter suggested that communities ought
to select their representatives in the interim parliament. Sixth, the warlords asserted that the tenure of an interim government be a period of
five years; the harmonized document designated three years. The two
documents were electronically posted (Hirraan.com) for three weeks,
and readers were able to vote online to register their preference. Eighty
percent of the respondents favored the harmonization charter.
Whatever the relative merits of the two documents, it was flabbergasting to witness the audacity of Ethiopia and its clients to demand
that their self-serving draft charter alone should be debated in the
plenary session. Also enigmatic was the fact that Ambassador Kiplagat, as Chairman of IGAD’s Technical Committee, succumbed to their
demands despite the fact that a significant number of the civil society
group and the official delegation of the TNG did not share the warlords’ demands. Soon thereafter, the Chairman’s task was made easier
by a growing split within the ranks of the TNG. The Prime Minister (Mr. Hassan Abshir) and the Speaker of the TNG Parliament (Mr.
Abdulla Deroow) decided, without prior consultation with the TNG’s
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decision-making committee, to vote in favor of a warlord’s proposal for
a compromise on major issues. With full realization that this change
of mind contradicted the TNG’s official (written and on file) position, the Chairman took advantage of the split by rushing the “signed
compromise” to the plenary. Even more bewildering, the plenary’s
function as the supreme locus of final debate and decisions (through
consensus), duly stipulated by the conference’s rules of procedure,
was premeditatedly preempted. Ambassador Kiplagat side-stepped
this protocol and relayed to the plenary that the “leaders” had agreed
on four key issues: the size of the assembly at 351 members; immediate
adoption of federalism; an interim period of four years; and warlords
and faction leaders, in consultation with traditional leaders, selecting
members of parliament. Many of the delegates supporting the warlord and Ethiopian agenda, having received early notification of what
was to come, cheered as Ambassador Kiplagat made the announcement. Others who were not forewarned objected to what they saw as
a deceitful stampede. Subsequently, they requested that the issues be
discussed. Ambassador Kiplagat responded that the decision was final
and immediately adjourned the meeting. The Ambassador’s behavior
contravened the letter and spirit of reconciliation, and fueled a growing suspicion that he was predisposed from the outset toward a warlord-Ethiopian pact. At such a late hour, unless he regained his role as
an impartial mediator, the entire process was likely to become illegitimate, with Kenya’s accepted role as a neutral Somali neighbor fatally
damaged and the peace conference doomed to the same fate as the
many others that preceded it. For Ethiopia and its client warlords, their
long-term project was clear: the warlords desired to either take total
control of the country without concern for the niceties of representation and democratic legitimacy or to remain in command of separate
fiefdoms. For its part, Ethiopia seemed bent on helping establish either
a weak client state in Somalia led by a favorite warlord or, perhaps better, fragmented and Bantustan-like territories in which Addis Ababa
would call the shots more directly. In brief, the last scenario Ethiopia
would welcome was a united and reinvigorated country, led by independent-minded and able Somali leaders.
The conclusion of the Mbagathi conference produced the following:
(a) a transitional Charter shaped by the political interests of the victorious warlords, through eighteen members of the Leaders Committee;
(b) a new name for the country, Somali Federal Transitional Republic;
(c) a national legislature consisting of two chambers; (d) supremacy of
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law; (e) freedom of the media; (f) the right to establish and organize
political parties; and (g) a tenure of five years for the Transitional Federal institutions.
A careful examination of the Transitional Charter conveys some
familiar but still laudable guarantees that were key ingredients in the
Constitution of the old Somali Republic. These include equality of
citizens in front of the law, freedom of expression and association, and
the right to education and property. But there are major deficiencies.
These could be divided into two: Charter-specific liabilities and TFG
shortcomings. Among the first are the endorsement of the change from
a unitary state to federalism without any nationwide discussion or
referendum, an open invitation for endless clanist intrigue for regional
status, the affirmation of an exaggerated number of seats in the new
Parliament (initially 337, later reduced to 275 for the lower house and
113 for an upper house yet to be set up), and an assumption that the
extremely feeble economy of the Somali Republic would be able to
support such an elaborate structure of governance. After nearly three
years of existence, the main weaknesses of the TFG have become even
more public. First, President Abdullahi Yusuf has proven to be short on
leadership capabilities fit for making the transition into a time for reconciliation, peace-making, and visionary competence. On the contrary,
he has undermined the promise by, among others: acting unilaterally
(a reminder of Siyaad Barre’s style); violating the division of power as
set by the Charter; threatening any opposition with violence; selecting
a prime minister with no leadership experience or qualifications suitable for such a complex task; acquiescing in the creation of 102 Cabinet positions whose appointees were mostly unqualified warlords or
their recommended kin; continuing the use of the idiom and logic of
clanism in his public and private utterances/calculations, all the way to
the composition of his intimate advisors and adjuncts; and, most distressingly, inviting Ethiopia as a patron for the physical survival of his
presidency and that of his regime.
The combined consequences of these structural and leadership
deformities have been grave and numerous. Perhaps most telling were
these facts: First, the TFG, in addition to serious internal and combustible divisions (typified by last year’s resignation of eighteen key ministers), has yet to find a permanent physical location inside the country
from which to govern, notwithstanding the highly temporary sites
in confined Jowhar earlier, latter insecure Baidoa, and now furiously
fought over Mogadishu. Compare this reality to President Abdullahi
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Yusuf’s overconfident address to the Summit of the Islamic Conference
in Mecca, Saudi Arabia, on December 8, 2005:
The Transitional Federal Government (TFG) is now fully functional
inside Somalia trying to reclaim the country from its lawlessness. We
are basically starting from scratch and despite our meager resources we
are steadily achieving a tangible progress on the ground. The consolidation of the New Government inside Somalia, together with improving
stability, create a real opportunity to achieve peace and security, promote
governance and the rule of law and begin recovery, reconstruction and
development throughout Somalia.19

Second, the division within the TFG continues to be deep and
wide:20 29 members of the cabinet resigned last August; the Prime Minister was confronted with a vote of no confidence by a large majority
of 200 parliamentary deputies who gathered to debate the efficacy of
the regime; and a senior minister was assassinated, while another was
injured. Third, and above all, there was the appearance and fast victories of the Union of Islamic Courts, who were defeated only with the
large Ethiopian invasion and brutal occupation—evidence for a thick
and broad alienation on the part of the larger public from the TFG.
C. The Union of Islamic Courts: An Alternative?
At the root of an awakened Islamic consciousness are at least eight
factors: globalization and its nefarious economic and social effects on
Islamic communities around the world; the total crash of the national
state attributed to the destructive policies and corrosive personal leadership and regime of Siyaad Barre; the subsequent descent into unprecedented internecine wars; the spread of clanist warlordism in pursuit
of individual and sectarian interests; an evaporation of ethical values
in public affairs; a paucity of a unifying civic action to successfully
respond to the prevailing conditions (particularly safety, order, and
economic well-being); an absence of an attractive vision expressive of
collective redemption and a regenerative future; and a glaring loss of
national pride that ushered in new levels of dependence and submissiveness to external machinations.
Notwithstanding a simplistic and quick typecasting by some observers, the composition of UIC was complex. Consequently, at this stage,
let alone during its brief triumph, it is still difficult to discern fully the
make up of the organization, its philosophical outlook, the sources
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of its funding, its conception of the transitional period, its style of
leadership and preferred form of state and governance, its long-term
aspirations for the country, and its complete strategy to interact with
the rest of the world. I will keep an engagement with these “on hold”
for another time. A point to note here is that, despite the demise of
the structure of the UIC, there is little doubt that its broad national
sentiments are held by a significant portion of the Somali people. This
implies that the sharpening contest over the long-term future of Somalia by its people will be shaped by, among others, the presence of social
and political Islamism. Such a development, in its generic necessity,
seems unavoidable. Both historical identity and the pestilential nature
of the present political climate press forth the relevance of a collective salvation informed by Islamic thought. If this is accurate, then, it
seems appropriate and timely to start sorting out different orientations
that might claim Islam as a source of inspiration. I proffer three broad
scenarios. The defunct UIC was not an exception. In fact, its members
might have conveyed all three perspectives. More importantly, both
the current resistance to Ethiopian invasion and its ally the TFG, and
debates over the future, are couched in Islamist terms that are similar to these orientations. Only the last option, in my opinion, has the
potential to fully capacitate the faithful to deal with an entropic Somali
Republic and an impatient hypermodern world.

1. Reactionary
In light of contemporary global affairs and the preoccupation with
“terrorism,” this is the most common scenario that jumps immediately
into the minds of the ill informed, especially non-Muslims. Beyond
such a stereotypical reflex, however, there are occasions when the label
fits. An inventory of features associated with a reactionary Islamic perspective includes: (a) a counterfeit innocence and zeal, (b) backwardlooking, literal, and completely dogmatic interpretations of the great
texts of the Quran and the Hadith, (c) brute application of those hackneyed positions to every aspect of human life, (d) aprioristic hostility
to other faiths, (e) annihilation of basic civic freedoms, (f) imposition of
extreme patriarchal domination, (g) intolerance toward secular learning, the play of reason in shaping human affairs, and scientific explorations and consequent ordering of relationships between humans and
the natural world, and (h) suppression of the autonomy of the aesthetic and, subsequently, the reduction of everyday life to an existence
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bereft of such creativity and joyous sensibilities as art, music and song,
poetry, theatre, dance, and sport. Albert Memmi, a long-term sympathizer with the peoples of Africa and the Islamic world, has come to
the same scathing conclusion:
But the victory of the fundamentalists would be a step backward; none
of the problems that threaten the modern world would be resolved. On
the contrary, it would be a systematic return to the past, involving the
exclusive use of traditional texts, suspicion of all novelty and critical
thought, the restriction, if not suppression, of the majority of civil liberties, greater police surveillance than that experienced under lay rulers,
increased attacks on women, the rigorous separation of the sexes, the
stifling of most anodyne and most natural aspirations of the young—
music, dancing—whose youth will be stolen, confiscated by the monster
of the theocratic state.21

In short, a reactionary Islamist project, appealing though it might be
to some who are enveloped by a chaotic and dehumanizing context,
is replete with cruel and disabling dead-ends. An example of such an
order was the rule of the Taliban in Afghanistan.

2. Conservative
An immediate attribute of this option is that it is at once more flexible than the reactionary mode and yet saddled with some similar
problems. First, a conservative Islamist approach has a modicum of
appreciation for the modern world, at least in the areas of administrative management, economic growth, technological adaptation, social
welfare, and, though highly filtered, a calculating engagement with
the rest of the world. Among the deficits are resistance to innovative
interpretations of the great texts, major constraints on basic personal
freedoms, and a limited participatory political order tightly woven
into patriarchal preferences. This perspective’s potential liabilities in
the long haul might be weighty enough to denude the assets. The
Islamic Republic of Iran, Saudi Arabia, and some of the Gulf States, in
their at times drastically different styles, manifest a basic mixture of
these attributes.
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3. Democratic and Developmental
This scenario integrates the best of these three sources of tacit knowledge and worthy values: Somali kinship, Islamic piety, and democracy
and development. The Somali tradition of kinship (as distinct from
clanism and beset with male dominance) emphasizes general fairness,
generosity, and obedience to Heer. At the heart of a worldly Islamic
philosophy is the promotion of peace, justice, and equality for all. “The
basic élan of the Quran,” writes Fazhur Rahman, is its “stress on socioeconomic justice and essential egalitarianism.” On the other hand,
democracy’s chief characteristics include individual liberty, choice, and
constitutional accountability of power, while development underscores
a perpetual but measured transformation of the cultural, environmental, scientific, economic, and political spheres of the society. Essential
indices for gauging such a strategy are an accent on ethical competence
and legitimate achievement; tolerance, if not respect for, nuance and
diversity through a normalization of Ijtihad; and freedom of thinking in a noncoercive atmosphere. No Muslim country in the modern
world has fully achieved this scenario. A few are slowly moving in that
direction, however, with Turkey and Malaysia as the most frequently
mentioned.
In an earlier work of nearly a decade-and-a-half ago, I suggested
that a dual challenge was facing Somali society: the first was how to
make a successful transition from an older and now atrophied mode
of being in the world to one that could enable Somalis to respond to
the critical vagaries of their existence—that is, subjective experiences
and objective imperatives thrown up by the demands of the modern
world; and, second, that such a transition required a creative and effective synthesis of kinship, Islamic virtues, and the fruits of modernity.22
Together, transition and synthesis are tantamount to a gearing up for
a new ontology. That assignment and what is at stake are even more
apparent today. If Somalis make headway in their epochal project,
then, they will have added a precious contribution to the struggle for
an Islamic cosmopolitanism robust enough to simultaneously co-exist
comfortably with the multicivilizational modern world and to negotiate successfully the ambiguities of globalization. To be sure, this is the
most daunting option—one whose pursuit will require all the intelligence, creativity, dexterity, discipline, and patience that Somalis can
muster. Despite the enormous difficulties, it is a journey pleasing to
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Allah, possible and most thrilling to begin against the humiliating
political squalor of the present.
V. The Necessity of the State and Options of Governance
Somalis are no different from other societies in that none could meet
its basic collective needs (ranging from security to environmental and
economic well-being to education and scientific advancement) without
an effective public power. As Adam Smith, the great sage of markets
and international exchange, taught us long ago, “the authority and
security of civil government is a necessary condition for the flourishing of liberty, reason, and happiness of humankind.” While this is
uniform across the modern world, the imperative is greatest among
late-developing societies. The state is not and cannot be everything
but its absence is a form of acute social homelessness. Even the World
Bank, contemporary apostle of market economics, made this landmark
assertion in 1997, with regard to the indispensability of the state for a
viable society:
…good government is not a luxury, it is a vital necessity for development…an effective state is vital for the provision of goods and services—
and the rules and institutions—that allow markets to flourish and people
to lead healthier, happier lives.23

The condition of the past sixteen years testifies to the supreme deficits
that come with the destruction of national political structures. Another
decade or more of the present situation is too horrible to contemplate.
But, in order to construct a new national and effective state, Somalis
will have to address this most difficult of issues: the resurrection of a
vibrant peoplehood. In that regard, it is a fact that the nationalist spirit
of collective belonging has been gravely damaged. The consequences
include mutual suspicion, anger, pent-up revenge, outright hate, and
social pulverization. At the same time, Somalia cannot amount to much
even in East Africa, let alone in the world, without a revival of that
very national identity. Put another way, if Somalis are unable, at least
at the present, to recreate an intimate political community, they still
have no choice but to establish a workable civil association that will
undergird a capable state. This is where a lesson from a metaphorical
pack of porcupines caught up in trauma similar to the Somali dilemma
is instructive.
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There was once, the philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer tells us, a colony
of porcupines. They were wont to huddle together on a cold winter’s
day and, thus wrapped in communal warmth, to escape being frozen.
But, plagued with the pricks of each other’s quills, they drew apart.
And every time the desire for warmth brought them together again, the
same calamity overtook them. Thus they remained, distracted between
two misfortunes, able neither to tolerate nor to do without one another,
until they discovered that when they stood at a certain distance from
one another they could both delight in one another’s individuality and
enjoy one another’s company. They did not attribute any metaphysical
significance to this distance, nor did they imagine it to be an independent source of happiness, like finding a friend. They recognized it to be
a relationship in terms not of substantive enjoyments but of contingent
considerabilities that they must determine for themselves. Unknown to
themselves, they had invented civil association.24

1. Annulment of the Union
This option denotes acceptance of the breakup of the Somali Republic
into two (and more) separate and sovereign states and a return to,
at minimum, the boundaries established by the colonial powers. The
rationale for this would include distinct colonial heritages, kin affiliations and sub-cultural differences, and a perception that the thirty
years of union were the basis for nefarious rule best symbolized by
Siyaad Barre’s regime.
A tearing up of the union, based on these arguments, is hard to
sustain. First, distinctions between colonial legacies (Britain and Italy)
had some relevance only during the early years of independence. For
instance, although both the English and Italian languages gave the educated elite of each territory a sub-identity, thirty years of union have
had an impact of such significance that many southern Somalis have
learned how to function in English (Italian is less frequent). Moreover,
both languages and their cultural accoutrements were limited to a very
small segment; the bulk of the population spoke (still speaks) Somali
(Mai/Maha). Second, though spatial proximity could foster affection
and intimate exchanges—including intermarriage—it can also create
anxieties and mutual antipathies (especially in an environment of very
scant and dwindling resources). In addition, many Somalis have, at
one time or another, crossed local boundaries and found the experience
pleasant and enriching. Third, neglect by earlier regimes was nationwide; the exceptions were places such as Mogadishu and commercial-
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ized spots in the riverine farming areas. The brutality of the Siyaad
Barre regime touched many, although the destruction of Hargeisa and
Burao were unmatched until Mogadishu exploded. Fourth, smallness,
coupled with underdevelopment, is not beautiful, but hideous. It combines internal brittleness and vulnerability with external manipulations. But the accomplishments must be acknowledged and preserved.
In the new dialogue to resurrect a national state, then, the leadership
of the North ought to use these chips as part of a strong inspirational
and bargaining stance rather than as obstacles to thwart a productive
national conversation.

2. Confederation
A confederated arrangement means an extremely loose relationship
between two or more equal states. These states relate to each other
through some international treaties and cooperate in specifically identified areas such as trade and defense. In the end, the power of authority
or sovereignty belongs to each state in the confederation. This minimalist arrangement strengthens regional identities and interests at the
cost of vibrant national institutions. Moreover, there is the real danger
of some people wanting power for themselves regardless of the consequences for the rest. In the modern world, a confederal arrangement
is mainly instructive as a historical artifact, the famous Swiss exception notwithstanding. Some will retort that the current EU resembles
such a design. Here, however, one must note two points: the great
diversity that the EU is aggregating (something akin to more than half
the numbers of contemporary African states) is grounded on many of
its members already being strong states and, moreover, the insistence
on the ultimate creation of an effective pan-European form of political
authority—perhaps a super state.

3. Federation
This form of governance underscores sharing power between regions/
provinces and a central authority. Though the nuances vary, in a federal
system the central government solely designs and manages areas such
as defense, international, and fiscal policy. Moreover, it shares with the
regions responsibilities like revenue generation, education, transportation and communication, health care, law and order, judiciary, public
administration, etc. Because of the nature of the distribution of power
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between the central structures and the somewhat autonomous provinces, federalism also carries some potential major dangers. First, and
particularly in the current climate, there is the difficulty of establishing
legitimate provinces. Where does one draw the boundaries? Second,
what becomes of equity/equality in those potential regions that will
house within their boundaries different kin groups? What would be
the lines of accountability between the province and the federal state?
Who will pay the cost of these levels of political privileges and bureaucratic administration? Since this scenario is the one most discussed, if
not strongly proposed by many, an extremely careful and workable
response to these concerns is necessary.

4. Decentralized Unitary State
A unitary state need not be a highly centralized form of governance in
which the regime of the day and the capital of the country monopolize
power and privilege. This, to a great extent, is the most unforgettable
lesson from Somalia’s post-colonial era, particularly the Siyaad Barre
era. A decentralized unitary scenario implies a strong central authority
but leaves some limited but important local decisions to the provinces
of the country. In comparison with a federal system, the center will be
mightier, with a clear secondary role for provincial and local authority.
The latter’s power is voluntarily ceded by the center; the central state,
however, monitors how that power is applied. There is little doubt that
a decentralized unitary state could be an effective mechanism to speak
on behalf of the whole Somali nation, and immediately undertake the
urgently needed projects of reconciliation, law and order, and rehabilitation of the national infrastructure. But there are unavoidable and
large questions here too: How far will the authority of a decentralized
unitary state go? Will the provinces have the constitutional mandate to
reign in a dictatorial central leadership? What liberties must be sought
through the structure of governance? What liberties must be promoted
within? What liberties must be protected from the reach of political
authority? In other words, what concrete constitutional arrangements
are needed to shield the society from a repeat of the worst of the
post-colonial experience? Are the porcupines ready and willing not
to embrace too tightly, yet get close enough to each other to form this
type of a state?
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VI. A Concluding Remark: Beyond the TFG
The Somali people, like other humans, cannot avoid the maelstrom of
their own history. Consequently, the choice is stark: bear the testing
burdens of transition and invent a stronger somalinimoo and a correlate
civic agenda or to continue, to paraphrase Bunyon, pulling flesh from
each other’s bones—the price of living in chronic political ignominy. In
addition to the discredited way in which the TFG was born, the transitional leadership is directly responsible for at least two phenomena:
a Somali invitation for an Ethiopian military invasion and consequent
occupation of Mogadishu; and a demonization of any Somali political
consciousness intersecting with Islamic thought and deduced practical design. Hitherto, most Somalis believed such acts to be so obscene
that they ruled them out of the realm of the possible. The two items
are intertwined but the latter is often prejudged through the prism of
“terrorism.” For Ethiopian ruling elites, it is an easy stance to embrace.
It fits well into a longstanding maltreatment of Muslim Ethiopians.
Despite the fact that at least half of the population is Muslim, the
power of the state, the commanding nodal points of the economy, and
the national cultural symbols have been dominated by the interests
and identity of the Coptic Christians. More specifically, the Somaliinhabited region is still the most impoverished of them all. In this
regard, although some changes in the way citizens of Somali heritage
are dealt with have been less harsh compared to earlier regimes, their
marginalization is still acute. Compounded by an apprehension based
on the Somali national belief that the region was wrongfully ceded to
Ethiopia by the colonial powers, the Ethiopian political class has consistently maintained a deep suspicion of, if not outright hostility towards,
a purposeful Somali people and their state. In other words, Ethiopian
leaders have always maneuvered to weaken any Somali national project. Notwithstanding the fact that the old Somali state gave direct and
concrete succor to Prime Minister Meles Zenawi during his years as
a hard-up dissident, the old grammar of Ethiopian obsession with
Somali national identity has not changed. Consequently, it did not take
much for the current leadership to jump into the front seat of the bandwagon of equating the resurgence of Islamist thinking in the Horn of
Africa to being the dangerous “other” and thus deserving of military
preemption. Among the great tragedies of the moment, however, is
the hoodwinking of the United States, much admired by most Somalis,
to endorse and actively support both the Ethiopian invasion and the
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much detested warlords masquerading as legitimate national leaders
of a new Somali democratic political dispensation. The aerial bombardment of fishing villages in the most southern coastal tip of the country,
alleged to be hiding places for individuals suspected of participating
in the terrorist destruction of the U.S. embassies in Nairobi and Dares-Salaam, cost at least seventy lives. This is now part of a bitter and
spreading lore among the Somali people who are at a loss as to why
the United States is prone to act so blunderingly. The bewilderment is
accented because most Somalis believe that the UIC invited the United
States government to come in and conduct a maximum search for the
suspected individuals said to have a sanctuary in the country.
If it is true in this contemporary diremption that the Somali Republic has lost almost everything, it has only one choice: to reimagine
itself. To do that, the most immediate and supreme tasks for the Somali
people, inside and outside, are to:
• establish a well-organized and vocal movement that salvages the
country from Ethiopian occupation and manipulation;
• create a credible alternative (a prefiguration of a future that is not—
yet) to the TFG in terms of ideas, organization, and leadership;
• link tightly the domestic communities and a mobilized diaspora;
• effectively explain to the world, particularly the United States, the
European Union, the African Union, the Organization of Islamic
States, the United Nations, and major NGOs, the realities of the situation in the Somali Republic and the yearning of the majority of the
Somali people for a democratic developmental order and legitimate
and competent leadership, enriched by their own virtuous traditions.
Notes
This document was prepared with the assistance of my student, Erin Gullikson, and my
Executive Assistant, Margaret Beegle. I also thank Heinemann for permission to use a
selected portion of The African State: Reconsiderations, edited by Abdi Ismail Samatar and
I, and Macalester College, publisher of Bildhaan.
1. Stephanie Nebehay, the UN Somalia humanitarian coordinator, released an alarming report that the current conflict in the Somali capital between Ethiopian troops and
“Somali insurgents” was about to turn “a humanitarian crisis…into a catastrophe and
very soon.” In the report 12,429 cases of acute diarrhea have been identified since January and 414, mostly children, have already succumbed to the disease. “UN Somalia
Humanitarian Chief Warns of Catastrophe,” Geneva: Reuters, 19 April 2007.
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2. Jeffrey Gettleman, “Islamists Calm Somali Capital with Restraint,” The New York Times,
25 September 2006, pp. 1 and 10.
3. The current American Administration’s perspective on the rise of Islamic political
consciousness in almost all Islamic societies around the world seems to be guided by
a deeply flawed reductionism—one that forecloses any intelligent exploration of the
reason behind the embrace of Islamist thinking in situations of unbearable globalization
or hypermodernity and the varieties of responsive Islamists’ political orientations and
agendas. Here is how a keen scholar has expressed this American strategic blunder—a
repeat of earlier and costly mistakes:
U.S. foreign policy and political Islam today are deeply intertwined. Policy makers, particularly since 9/11, have demonstrated an inability and/or unwillingness to distinguish between radical and moderate Islamists. They have largely
treated political Islam as a global threat similar to the way that Communism
was perceived. However, even in the case of Communism, foreign policymakers
eventually moved from an ill-informed, broad-brush, and paranoid approach
personified by Senator Joseph McCarthy in the 1950s to more nuanced and pragmatic policies that led to the establishment of relations with China in the 1970s,
even as the tensions remained between the United States and the Soviet Union.
John L. Esposito, “Islamists and US Foreign Policy,” ISIM Review, Autumn 2006,
p. 6.
4. Ignacio Remonet reports that, “The Pentagon encouraged it to launch an offensive
against Somalia, providing aerial reconnaissance and satellite surveillance support.”
Ignacio Remonet, “Somalia,” Le Monde Diplomatique, February 2007, p. 1. The U.S. is contributing $14 million to the cost of “peacekeeping.”
5. Somali Solidarity of North America (SOSIVA), “A Word of Warning to the World:
Genocide in the Making,” accessed at somali.solidarity@qmail.com. This release includes
the following (a tad hyperbolic) statement:
We are not using the world ‘genocide’ loosely here. The mass murder, rampant
slaughter of innocent Somalis, the displacement of more than 100,000 people and
the campaign to wipe out whole Mogadishu neighborhoods is comparable to the
Darfur genocide. We perceive the Somali version of the Janjaweed as the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) supported militia from Puntland belonging to
the President’s clan, numbering 4,000, camped in Villa Somalia and the Military
academy that are intentionally shelling and targeting heavy artillery into the
neighborhoods populated by rival clans. This is a calculated clannish vengeance
that the international community is unfortunately condoning.
The Chief of the European Commission’s delegation to Kenya announced that he had
created a team to examine serious allegations of war crimes said to be committed by
Ethiopian-cum-TFG militia against civilian populations. Jeffrey Gettleman, “Somali Battles Bring Claims of War Crimes: Ethiopia and Allies Faulted as 300 Die,” The New York
Times, April 6, 2007, p. A8. See also, Ibrahim Farah, “Somali Diaspora Communiqué,”
Leicester, England, April 6–8, 2007; “Response of Concerned Somalis to Report of Monitoring Group Re-violations of UN Sanctioned Arms Embargo on Somalia,” Mogadishu,
November 28, 2006; and “Bayaan Ka Soo Baxay Jaaliyada Daarood Ee London,” London,
21 April 2007. This last group (who consist of political figures, intellectuals, religious
authorities, women, and youth representatives) met for three weeks of intensive conver-
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sations in London. In their communiqué they articulate a number of important points
but two seem to stand out: (1) “in aan laga aamusnaan karin fal gaboodka iyo xasuuga ay ka
geysanayaan magaalada Muqdisho ciidamada cadawga ee Ethopia & damiirlawayaasha u adeega
[There should be no silence over the aggression and destruction visited upon the city of
Mogadishu by Ethiopian enemy forces and the conscienceless who serve them] and (2)
Waxaan ugu baaqeynaa ummada Soomaliyeed in si wadajir ah dalka & diinta loo difaaco, lagana
gayb galo dagaalka looga xoreynaayo dalka gumeystaha & u adeegayaashiisa” [We urge the
Somali nation to defend, in solidarity, the homeland and the faith; and to partake of the
battle to liberate the country from colonialists and their collaborators].
6. Jeffrey Gettleman, “The New Somalia: A Grimly Familiar Rerun of Chaos,” The New
York Times, 21 February 2007, p. A3.
7. Jacob Burkhardt, The Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy, translated by S.G.C. Middlemore (New York: The Modern Library, 2002), p. 4.
8. Julien Benda, The Betrayal of the Intellectuals, translated by R. Aldington (Boston: Beacon Press, 1955), pp. 30–31. On the tasks of the intellectual, I add here two that have been
asserted (for poets/critics) by Breyten Breytenbach: “He [she] is the questioner and the
implacable critic of the mores and attitudes and myths of his [her] society… . he [she]
is also the exponent of the aspirations of his [her] people.” Breyten Breytenbach, End
Papers: Essays, Letters, Articles of Faith, Workbook Notes (New York: Farrar, Straus and
Giroux, 1986), p. 99.
9. The following section of the essay directly draws on Abdi Ismail Samatar and Ahmed
I. Samatar, eds., The African State: Reconsiderations (Portsmouth, Maine: Heinemann,
2002), pp. 5–12.
10. Antonio Gramsci, Ordine Nuova, quoted in Ralph Miliband, Marxism and Politics (London: Oxford University Press, 1977), p. 181.
11. The Mail and Guardian, Johannesburg, South Africa, 3 September 1999.
12. This section directly draws on my “Statelessness as Homelessness,” in The African
State, pp. 226–234.
13. Abdi Ismail Samatar and Ahmed I. Samatar, “Somalis as Africa’s First Democrats:
Premier Abdirazak H. Hussein and President Aden A. Osman.” Bildhaan, vol. 2, 2002, p.
59.
14. Christopher Clapham, “Democratization in Africa: Obstacles and Prospects,” Third
World Quarterly 14, no. 3 (1993): 430.
15. Julian Prior, Pastoral Development Planning (Oxford: OXFAM, 1994), pp. 66–67.
16. Mark Bradbury, Adan Yusuf Abokor, and Haroon Ahmed Yusuf, “Somaliland: Choosing Politics over Violence,” Review of African Political Economy 30 no. 97 (2003): 455–470.
Also, A. Huliaras, “The Viability of Somaliland: Internal Constraints and Regional Geopolitics,” Journal of Contemporary African Studies 20, no. 2 (2002): 157–182.
17. This part of the essay draws directly on Ahmed I. Samatar and Abdi Ismail Samatar,
“Somali Reconciliation: Editorial Note.” Bildhaan, vol 3, 2003, pp. 3–11. Also see Che
Aulu, “The Reasons for Fairness in the Reunification of Somalia,” Africa Insight 34, no. 1
(2004): 69–76.
18. Interview with President Ismail Omer Gaileh, Baltimore, Maryland, November,
2005.
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19. Also see “Statement by H.E. Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed, The President of the Republic
of Somalia at the 60th Anniversary of the United Nations General Assembly, New York,”
September 17, 2005.
20. See “Joint Communique” released by Sherif Hassen Sheikh Adem, Hussein Mohamed
Farah Aidid, and Sheikh Sherif Sheikh Ahmed. They are identified as: “Chairman of the
Somali Parliament,” “Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Somali Public Works,” and
“Chairman of the Executive Council of the Union of Islamic Courts of Somalia.” Asmara,
April 17, 2007. The salient declarations made in the communiqué are:
• “We congratulate the heroic people of Somalia, and their victorious resistance, and
we call upon all citizens everywhere to oppose the Ethiopian occupation, defend
their country, and guarantee the freedom and independence of the nation.”
• “We condemn the brutal occupation of Ethiopia in Somalia and call for its immediate withdrawal from sovereign Somali territory.”
• “We condemn the atrocities committed from Thursday 29th March to 1st of April
2007 by the Ethiopian armed forces that have resulted in the killing of approximately 1,086 civilians and wounding of 4,244 sustaining various light and serious
injuries.”
• “We condemn the destructive actions undertaken by the Deputy Secretary of State
for African Affairs, which incited Ethiopian troops to continue down its path of
destruction and genocide against defenseless civilians via promising financial and
political support to continue its illegitimate war and devote Ethiopian brutal occupation.”
• “We ask the international community and the United Nations to establish a special
International Tribunal in the search for the crimes committed against the Somali
people and prosecute the criminals responsible for these hideous crimes.”
• “We condemn Ethiopia for establishing detention camps in its territory like that of
‘Guantanamo Bay’ in Cuba, where innocent people are being tortured.”
• “We inform the world that the Ugandan troops currently in the Somali Capital are a
‘Trojan Horse’ for the unjust Ethiopian occupation.”
• “We regret and condemn the stand of Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda in the Ministerial Meeting of IGAD member states that was held on Friday, April 13, 2007 against
the independence and sovereignty of Somalia, where they praised and incited the
brutal assault carried out by the Ethiopian troops in Somalia. We commend the
honest and genuine approach of the governments of Eritrea, Sudan, and Djibouti
towards their view in the Somali issue.”
• “We request the concerned local and international humanitarian organizations to
deliver urgent relief supplies to displaced Somalis everywhere, in particular food
and medical treatments because concentration of human population formed suddenly may result in sweeping epidemics such as cholera and typhoid.”
21. Albert Memmi, Decolonization and the Decolonized (trans. Robert Bononno), Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2006, p. 48. Also, Sadia Ahmed, “Islam and Development: Opportunities and Constraints for Somali Women,” Gender and Development 7, no.
1 (1999): 69–72.
22. Ahmed I. Samatar, “The Curse of Allah,” in The Somali Challenge: From Catastrophe to
Renewal, Ahmed I. Samatar, ed. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1994), p. 138.
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23. World Bank, World Development Report (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997).
24. Quoted in Michael Oakshott, Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays (Indianapolis:
Liberty Fund, 1991), pp. 460–461.
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